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HOW TO RESPOND TO ANTIDUMPING DUTIES?  KOREA, UNITED STATES, 





This study examines the response of Korean steel firms after being assessed antidumping 
duties in the United States. The U.S. market represents the second largest export market 
for Korea (after China), but increased liberalization in the Korean economy since the 
1997 financial crisis has strengthened the independence and competitiveness of certain 
industries and the economy as a whole.  Multinational Korean steel firms have 
encountered highly politicized protection in the U.S. and have had to adjust their 
strategies accordingly.  This study examines traditional alternatives to counter 
antidumping and other forms of protectionism before reviewing export trade data in 
affected product groups.  The data suggests that there is a positive, yet insignificant, 
relationship between U.S. antidumping duties and Korean steel exports to an alternative, 





Antidumping, as an impediment to trade, is one of the largest artificial obstacles 
to a firm’s global strategy.  While most other forms of protectionism, such as tariffs, 
quotas, and voluntary export restraints, have been weakened under the GATT/WTO 
supervision, antidumping has actually boomed since 1980 (Blonigen and Prusa, 2002, p. 
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251).  The increase in antidumping filings may be due to the weakening of other 
instruments of protection or the fact that until 1980, GATT/WTO did not require 
antidumping filings to be reported.  Regardless of the reason for the increase, 
antidumping actions have serious ramifications for firms and industries with interests in 
international markets.  
Despite the significance of antidumping to the strategy of the firm, there is 
relatively little literature in international business on this issue.  The Journal of 
International Business Studies, the field’s number one academic journal, for example, 
only has one published article on the subject of antidumping in its 25-years of publishing.  
There is a limited amount of academic work on how antidumping, and other forms of 
protectionism, affect the operations of a multinational corporation.  Moore (2002) looks 
at the foreign firm’s willingness to provide information to the U.S. International Trade 
Commission (USITC) in an antidumping duty investigation in a Bertrand Nash setting.  
Blonigen and Ohno (1997) endorse the idea of a firm provoking antidumping 
investigations through an artificially inflated amount of exports.  Blonigen and Ohno call 
this “protection-building trade”, and introduce it as a weapon for firms to use against 
rivals foreign rivals.  Salvatore (1991) discusses the correlation between increases in 
foreign direct investment and trade protectionism.  Bark (1993) specifically looks at the 
reaction of firms to an affirmative antidumping filing.  In the 1980’s Korean electronics 
firms responded to antidumping by adjusting home market prices.  Bark’s “The Korean 
Consumer Electronics Industry: Reaction to Antidumping Actions” is where this paper 
departs from.  Specifically, how do Korean steel firms respond after antidumping duties 
have been assessed in the U.S. market?  I look exclusively at the steel industry as steel 
 3
has been by far the most heavily regulated U.S. import from Korea, accounting for eight 
of the ten antidumping duties issued since 1997. 
I will begin this paper in my second section by re-visiting the lessons from Bark’s 
case and similar antidumping cases, such as Japanese televisions.  Both cases feature an 
uncompetitive home market that faced the consequences for foreign success or failure.  
The following section will discuss the South Korean economy.  The examination of 
antidumping through Korean firms was not by accident.  In addition to being a large 
importer to the United States and a major target of antidumping investigations, South 
Korea (hereafter referred to as ‘Korea’) has seen a marked shift in national economic 
policy.  The liberalization of markets and restructuring of the economy, in the wake of 
the 1997 financial crisis, has been dramatic.   
The fourth and fifth section of the paper will focus on the industries and firms in 
question.  I will be dealing with industries that have been found guilty of antidumping 
through petitions filed in the last seven years.  Therefore, Korean steel will be featured 
predominantly.  Eighty percent of the cases from the aforementioned time period 
involved the steel industry.  The U.S. steel industry has struggled into the 21st century, 
and the sheltering they have received from the U.S. government has been highly 
publicized.  Protectionism has not only been aimed at Korean manufacturers, but all steel 
imports, as the price for raw materials has climbed.  Section four will focus on U.S. 
protectionism and antidumping in the industry while section five will examine the Korean 
steel industry.  These cases should provide a basis to analyze response to antidumping 
duties, even when one considers multiple third markets and multiple firms are engaged in 
the Korean steel industry.  The sixth section will review strategic response options to 
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antidumping charges, as shaped by national policy and economic theory.  The seventh 
section will review the antidumping case portfolio and the eighth section will analyze 
pricing, market, and volume reactions from the affected industries.  The ninth section will 
discuss the findings. 
 
II.  Korean and Japanese Consumer Electronics Industry 
 
 The two aforementioned cases are unique, but share similarities.  I will begin with 
the Korean case.  From 1973 until 1989, nine of fifteen antidumping cases against Korean 
consumer electronics industry firms worldwide resulted in duties; two of the nine were 
from the United States (Bark, 1993, p. 127).  During this time, Korean firms faced a 
disproportionate amount of antidumping charges to their share of world exports, mostly 
as a result of their controversial national development economic plans.  To expand 
income and technology, the Korean government invested in new industries through direct 
subsidies, tax exemptions, accelerated depreciation allowances, and preferential loans.  In 
addition, there was a restriction on imports of consumer electronics until 1982, from 
which point each import required a ‘recommendation’ from the Korean producers 
association (Bark, 1993, p. 122). Bark reminds us that although there are 150 firms in this 
industry, there are three conglomerates which dominate the industry1; Samsung 
Electronics Co., Ltd., Daewoo Electronics Co. Ltd., and Gold Star Co. Ltd. (a member of 
the LG family).   
                                                
1 Daewoo, LG, and Samsung accounted for 93.5% of the consumer electronics market in 1987 according to 
the World Technology Evaluation Center at Loyola College, Baltimore, Maryland. 
 5
The first antidumping duties were imposed against color television sets from the 
three top firms in 1983 by the U.S. and other Western countries (including Australia and 
the European Community).  The aim of the industry was to avoid a continuation of these 
duties upon review of the initial affirmative antidumping act.  Due to the circumstances 
in the home market, the Korean firms decided to lower their prices in Korea in order to 
avoid antidumping duties.  Raising prices in the U.S. market would have meant pricing 
themselves out of the market.  They therefore took advantage of their significant 
dominance and protection in the home market, which accounted for only one-third of 
their global sales. 
According to Bark, export prices for color television sets had been falling in the 
early 1980s before the imposition of the antidumping duties.  The duties did not change 
the trend as export prices fell by 6 percent from 1983 to 1984 and 12 percent more by 
1988.  Meanwhile, home market prices, which were level from a period of 1980 to 1983, 
began falling after the antidumping order.  The decline in home market prices was 19 
percent and 30 percent below the 1983 level in 1985 and 1988, respectively.  There were 
similar cases during the 1980s in which the home market prices of other consumer 
electronics, microwave ovens and cassette recorders, declined after antidumping duties 
were imposed in an export market. 
Just as significant to us as the case and firms’ responses are the implications of 
these cases on the Korean economy.  The 1980s marked the beginning of a change 
toward greater liberalization in the East Asian nation, and this case with consumer 
electronics made certain issues more evident.  First, this case made public in Korea the 
discriminatory behavior of the industry.  The sudden drop in domestic prices (in response 
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to the antidumping duties) had Korean officials asking why prices were so high before 
the antidumping duties.  Clearly, the oligopolisitc nature of the market allowed for the big 
three consumer electronics companies to set their prices artificially high.  A special 
hearing was held in front of the Committee on Trade and Industry where the trade 
minister and executives from Samsung, Daewoo, and Gold Star were criticized.  In a 
marked shift from past practice, the welfare of Korean consumers was put before special 
interests, and the recommendation of the committee was to lower domestic prices.  
Second, this case and the complement of other antidumping and countervailing duty 
cases during the period made it apparent that friction with major trading partners was 
going to increase so long as the Korean economy remained heavily protected.  Korea 
began import liberalization to reduce friction and also in the interests of decreasing input 
prices for manufacturers and the welfare of consumers.  
 
 The Japanese television cartel of the 1960s and 1970s (Schwartzman, 1993) 
featured some of the same characteristics as the Korean consumer electronics industry.  
They include an uncompetitive home market and large discrepancies between home 
market and foreign market prices. 
 The marketplace was orchestrated by Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and 
Investment (MITI), which provided advantages to exporting firms and, more importantly, 
reduced intra-firm competition in export markets.  In the home market, MITI, in collusion 
with the large Japanese keiritsus regulated output, inventories, retail and wholesale 
margins, as well as retail prices (Schwartzman, 1994, p. 89).  They were successful 
largely because of the weak political power of the Fair Trade Commission of Japan and 
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the Antimonopoly Law (Schwartzman, 1994, p. 75).  In the export market, the Japanese 
firms colluded to reduce costs by limiting competition to non-Japanese firms.  MITI 
established a Five-Company Rule and Antiraiding Rule, both of which maintained the 
status quo for Japanese firms selling in the U.S. market by placing strict limits on the 
seller and buyer (Schwartzman, 1994, p. 95).  Japanese firms could not compete for each 
other’s customers and the U.S.-based customers could only go through one Japanese firm 
per most contracts. 
 The large price discrepancies between the home market and export market were a 
result of successful collusion by the cartel in the Japanese home market.  Excess capacity 
from monopoly profits in the home market was used to expand capacity in the United 
States.  This would not have been the first time that a Japanese industry had used this 
tactic, or the idea of “sacrifice exports” to compete overseas.  During the 1950s, evidence 
shows that the Japanese sewing manufacturers deliberately took losses in order to raise 
their level of exports by 50 percent in the following year (Schwartzman, 1995, p. 93).  
Schwartzman recognizes that collusion in the home market means that dumping is more 
likely in the foreign market, but he acknowledges how the Matsushita case asked the 
reverse.  More specifically, does dumping in an overseas market imply collusion in the 
home market?  As a major point of contention for the two aforementioned cases; this is a 
question that, if true, implies a probable response strategy option for antidumping duties.  
Therefore, I will return to this question during my discussion of response strategy 
options, in section six. 
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 At the end of the “cartel” case, which may be better known as Matsushita v. 
Zenith, the U.S. and Japan negotiated a bilateral agreement that included voluntary export 
restraints and orderly marketing agreements.  Antidumping duties did not result. 
Overall, the Japanese and Korean cases are relevant to this study because they 
both demonstrate the significance of national economic policy and formal institutions to 
firm decisions in alleged dumping and antidumping duties.  The consumer electronics 
case represent a case where there was a highly uncompetitive home market, government 
support to exporting firms, and a system at trade administration for selecting “winners” 
and “losers” to promote as a flag-carrier firm.  MITI began subsidizing “favored” firms 
before the end of U.S. occupation (Schwartzman, 1994, p. 9).  Just as in Korea, the 
successful Japanese firms received preferential loan treatment, in this case from the Bank 
of Japan. 
 
III.  Liberalization of the Korean Economy 
 
 Since the end of the Korean War, the Korean government has continually adapted 
the national economic policy to changing external conditions.  Unfortunately for the 
Koreans, they lacked natural resources and a strong economic base from which start from 
in the 1950s.  Therefore, Korea pursued an export promotion and infant industry 
protection through an import substitution policy (Lee, Choi, and Kang, 2001, p. 51).  The 
Korean export regime had a system for supporting the efficient firms over the less 
successful ones (Choi, 2002).  Import permits and quotas for upstream products were 
linked to export performance. 
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Korea’s protection of infant industries and investment in education meant that 
capital and skilled labor became abundant.  Heavy industries, such as steel, are skilled-
labor intensive and capital intensive, and thus a larger share of exports began to shift to 
these sectors (Song, 1996).  With their history of the unresolved armed conflict with the 
North Korea, this economic shift was in also in the best national security interests (Choi, 
2002).  The percentage of exports in the heavy and chemical industries increased from 
12.8% in 1970 to 55.2% by 1990 and in 2000 stood at 80.8%.  Meanwhile, agricultural 
and light industrial products have both fallen to below 25% of their 1970 level of 
percentage of export volume (Korean International Trade Association (KITA), Choi, 
2002, p. 15). 
These policies resulted in significant gains for the Korean economy.  The share of 
trade in the national income jumped from 53.2% to 72.7% from 1990 to 2000, according 
to the Bank of Korea.  Korea also ran a sizeable surplus against the United States up until 
the 1990s.   
Naturally, pressure came from international organizations and trading partners for 
Korea to begin to liberalize.  This was the first of many triggers that saw the government 
liberalize some sectors of the national economy.  Other factors that accelerated this 
liberalization include the 1995 Uruguay Round, the 1996 accession to the OECD, and the 
1997 Asian financial crisis.  Korea has since exceeded OECD liberalization levels, 
further increasing the amount of foreign investment into the country (Kim and Kim, 
2001).   
Since the creation of the WTO in 1995, free trade agreements and expansion of 
trade into new markets has exploded.  There were 200 free-trade agreements in the year 
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2000.  Korea has been able to enjoy these benefits.  As a result of the creation of the 
WTO and the Uruguay Round discussions, Korean firms were able to diversify their 
export markets (Choi, 2002, p. 38) from non-tariff barriers were broken down in 
emerging markets.  One such market is China.  Korean firms view the accession of China 
to the WTO in 2001 as bittersweet.  Although Korean enterprises will be able to enjoy the 
fruits of an emerging, large, and more open export market, they are apprehensive about 
having to compete directly with Chinese manufacturers in third markets.  In the last four 
years, Korean exports to China have increased an average annual growth rate of 40.3% to 
the point where mainland China (excluding Hong Kong) represents 27% of their exports, 
up from only 11% in 1998 (KITA, 2005).  In addition to China, a larger proportion of 
Korean exports are going to non-traditional export markets, such as the Middle East, and 
away from the dominant export markets (Asian or North American markets) after the 
1997 Asian financial crisis than before.  This shift may represent a diversification in 
global strategy for most Korean firms.  (Yang and Kim, 2000). 
 Liberalization of the markets and greater access to new foreign markets only 
represents part of the structural changes to the national economy.  There has been 
significant restructuring of government and business relations in Korea.  In 1993, the 
Korea Fair Trade Commission acted on the nation’s seldom used antitrust laws.  Six 
unfair trade practices were targeted in an investigation of 574 firms linked to 30 chaebols 
(Jwa, 2001, p. 89).   
Similar to the opening of markets, a significant amount of restructuring was set in 
motion by the 1997 financial crisis, when chaebols were criticized for having too much 
power.  Reform was mostly dealt with stripping the chaebols of this disproportionate 
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amount of power they wielded in the national economy.  Cross-ownership and cross-debt 
guarantees were banned in March 2000.  The holding company system was also removed, 
however it was then reintroduced the following year, albeit under a very restricted 
version (Jwa, 2001, p. 89). 
Some critics of the reforms argue that because of the volatile nature of Korea’s 
sunrise and sunset industries, it is difficult to implement effective policy chance (Choi, 
2002, p. 50).  And, reminiscent of past Korean economic plans, special benefits, such as 
tax breaks and easier credit access, were extended to selected firms that could help revive 
the economy, which depends heavily on international economic conditions (Jwa, 2003, p. 
85).  Consequently, the restructuring of the Korean economy after the Asian financial 
crisis has been a source of trade tension, especially with the United States.  The foreign 
perception, especially held in the United States, is that the Korean government would 
“unfairly” subsidize Korean exports with IMF and other international funds.  (Yang and 
Kim, 2000, p. 41).  Yang and Kim go on to note that some discontent among U.S. 




IV. U.S. Steel Protectionism 
 
Of the ten U.S. antidumping petitions ending in duty orders and filed and 
completed against Korean firms between 1998 and the end of 2004, eight of them 
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involved the steel industry.2  The other two cases concerned polyvinyl alcohol and 
polyester staple fiber.  These cases represent all petitions filed after January 1, 1998 that 
reached an affirmative final decision by the U.S. ITC.  It should be no surprise that eighty 
percent of the most recent duties are in the steel industry, as that is one of the most 
contentious industries in the United States, especially with regards to imports.   
There is no denying that the U.S. steel industry was heavily affected by the Asian 
financial crisis.  In the wake of the financial crisis, East Asian governments did two 
things to strengthen the worldwide competitiveness of their national steel industry against 
the U.S. industry.  Governments, such as Korea’s, provided short-term financial support 
to steel; a heavy industry that the government hoped would jump start the economy, and 
the government, in compliance with international loans, worked to restructure key 
industries such as steel.  However, Korea had been responsible for only a small 
percentage of the fluctuation in the U.S. steel markets in the five years following the 
crisis.  Korean imports were equal to only 44% of Japanese imports responsible for the 
surge in imported steel in the United States in 1998.  U.S. steel industry has historically 
lobbied and obtained protection from imports.  Moore describes the steel industry’s 
strategy in obtaining trade protection as follows: 
 
“A common aspect of these episodes has been that the integrated steel sector has 
secured intervention outside the normal administrative protection procedures of 
US trade law.  The standard steel industry approach is to use, or threaten to use, 
the relatively nondiscretionary AD and CVD (countervailing) processes as a 
                                                
2 In my paper, I have classified all of the products based on the first six numbers of the Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule (HTS) of the United States.  Of the eight steel cases, seven cases dealt with products in Chapter 
72, iron and steel, and one case had a product in Chapter 73, articles of iron and steel.  The other two cases 
of polyvinyl alcohol and polyester stable fiber come are in Chapter 39 and Chapter 55, respectively. 
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lever to obtain an agreement providing some degree of US price stability.  First, 
integrated steel producers (often with close cooperation of the [United 
Steelworkers]) file massive petitions under US trade remedy laws, especially AD 
and CVD (countervailing duty) petitions.  Such petitions have made successful 
litigation likely.  Parallel to the trade remedy cases, congressional supporters of 
the steel industry propose quota legislation inconsistent with the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  Before the quasi-judicial 
administrative protection process can grind to completion and prior to final votes 
on the legislation, the executive branch will urge steel industry to accept a 
negotiated settlement with foreign exporters, usually a voluntary-restraint 
agreement.  In essence, the rules-based administrative protection procedures have 
been utilized as a credible threat to force political settlements on trade disputes.” 
(Moore, 1996, p. 74-75) 
 
Yang and Kim point out that Moore’s characterized strategy was played out with 
protection of steel during the late 1990s and the turn of the century.  After Congress 
passed an import quota bill that was “against the rules and principles of the WTO” (Yang 
and Kim, 2000, p. 49), President Clinton and commercial attaches visited with Korean 
industry and political leaders to apply pressure on the Korean steel industry.  The U.S. 
executive branch had multiple requests, including: 
• Elimination of “market-distorting” subsidies and support to Hanbo Iron and 
Steel and Dongkuk 
• The complete privatization and severing of all governmental ties to Pohang 
Iron and Steel Company (POSCO) 
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• Assurance that the Korean steel sector operates on a “market-driven basis” 
In response, the Korean government of Kim Dae-jung pledged to privatize 
POSCO, as the government had already begun to sell off their remaining 33% share in 
late 19983. 
 
In 1999, total and Korean steel imports to the United States declined by 22 and 26  
percent, respectively (KITA, 2005).  Despite the decline of steel imports to ‘pre-crisis’ 
levels, U.S. steel firms continued to lobby for additional support.  Four antidumping 
petitions were filed during 1999 and 2000 by U.S. firms against Korean steel firms such 
as POSCO, Hanbo, and Inchon Steel.  Each of them resulted in an affirmative final 
decision.  The U.S. is not alone in building barriers to Korean steel.  As of March 2003, 
eleven nations had trade restrictions against Korean steel.  The U.S. does command a 
significant proportion of the trade restrictions, 21 of the 42 standing worldwide, but 
Canada accounts for six restrictions while China and Thailand have two each (Chart 1).  
Of the 21 American trade restrictions on Korean steel, thirteen are in the form of an 
antidumping duty.  As an official of KOSA noted, “import restrictions on steel products 
were a ‘monopoly’ of advanced nations in the past, but lately, developing nations such as 
China and Thailand have taken protectionist steps”4.  We will revisit the emerging 
protectionism of heavy industries later in this paper. 
 Returning to the U.S., decisive protectionism under the executive branch has a 
recurring theme.  Under the Bush Administration, in 2001, the U.S. imposed safeguard 
tariffs against imported steel until they were removed in December 2002.   
                                                
3 Office of the Press Secretary, White House, 01.07.1999 
4 Yonhap, 03.11.2003 
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V. Korean Steel 
 
 In the opinion of some Korean policy makers, the U.S. steel industry is now 
undergoing the restructuring that Korea was forced to endure after the financial crisis.  
The recovery strategy included mergers, alliance, modernization of plants, and the 
bankruptcy of several nonviable firms.  As an official in the Ministry of Commerce, 
Industry and Energy put it, “We have restructured our steel industry better than our 
competitors and there is really nothing to lose from production cuts”5.  Perhaps there is 
truth to this statement coming as U.S. steel simultaneously requests protection.  “The 
search for government protection is an indicator of failure to become internationally 
competitive” (Rugman and Verbeke, 1989, p. 6).  In other words, the protection-seeking 
firm is limited to selling in the home market. 
Equally concerning to the Korean steel industry as U.S. protectionism has been 
the emergence of Japanese producers in the Korean markets in the late 1990s.  Koreans 
are making their own antidumping claims against Japanese firms, who, Korean industry 
experts argue, are to blame for the price instability in the global steel market.  A three-
year comparison, from 1998 to 2000, illustrates the rapid expansion by Japanese steel 
into Korea.  In 1998 Japanese exports to Korea stood at 120,000 tons, only to rise to 1.86 
million and 3 million in 1999 and 2000, respectively6. 
 Turning our attention to the Korean market, three players dominate the industry.  
Pohang Steel (POSCO) is Korea’s largest firm and the world’s fifth largest steel firm 
                                                
5 Asia Times, 11.29.2001 
6 Asia Times, 12.20.2000 
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with sales of just under $12 billion in 2003.  INI, a subsidiary of Hyundai, is the nation’s 
second leading producer of steel, with sales of over $3 billion in 2003.  Finally, Dongkuk, 
the third largest producer on the peninsula, recorded $1.7 billion in sales for the same 
calendar year7.  The last few years have been much rosier for the steel industry, as global 
demand has surged.  As a result, import prices of raw materials have increased, forcing 
firms to continually raise prices for steel.  By August of 2004, POSCO had already raised 
steel prices four times on the year, as shipbuilders in Korea and Asia face a shortage of 
steel8. 
 The above 2003 figures all resulted in record profits as Korean firms are enjoying 
the boom in demand from the emergence of developing economies.  Having assessed the 
structural changes to the economy, the current trade situation, and the Korean steel 
industry, I will now turn my attention to the response strategy options that Korean steel 
could pursue in facing affirmative antidumping duties. 
 
VI. Response Strategy Options 
 
 In presenting the response strategy options, I present three alternatives (See Chart 
2).  First, I will analyze the probability of pursuing the past practice of altering home 
market prices with non-market forces to recover for adjustments in foreign prices.  
Second, I will look at perhaps the most conventional response to protectionism, foreign 
direct investing.  Third, I will look at the prospect of shifting the weight of and 
diversifying the export market portfolio.   
                                                
7 Sohn, S.J., Yonhap, 01.06.2004 
8 Cho, H.R., Chosun Ilbo, 08.19.2004 
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I am not considering the payment of the antidumping duties as an alternative 
because I feel that option can be quickly eliminated on the following grounds.  The duty 
negates one firm’s original pricing strategy and that is why in the majority of cases 
imports into the foreign market decrease after the imposition of the duty.  In situations 
where the industry wishes to continue to export to the foreign market, settlements are 
usually agreed to that involve voluntary-export restraints or export taxes and the 
antidumping investigation is terminated.  In 1986, Canada imposed a fifteen percent tax 
on exports of softwood lumber as part of a settlement to end an antidumping investigation 
in the United States.  Their motivation was that under these circumstances, at least the 
revenue would be kept in Canada (Rugman and Porteous, 1988, p. 38)9. 
 
I will begin my discussion on the first alternative, price collusion, by citing work 
where Schwartzman (1993) answers the aforementioned question, “Does dumping imply 
collusion in the home market?”, that he poses in his book, The Japanese Television 
Cartel. 
“Independently competing oligopolists, not one of which has a dominant share, 
may also discriminate in price (between domestic and foreign prices), but the 
margin between the market prices will be much smaller than in the case of a 
dominant firm or cartel.” (Schwartzman, 1993, p. 44) 
 
 This proposition implies that we cannot necessarily assume that the Korean firms 
cited with antidumping duties in the last seven years are colluding to set artificial prices 
                                                
9 Regardless, in these cases, an affirmative final decision was never reached, and therefore, they are not in 
the scope of this paper.   
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or restrict output in the home market, as compared to over twenty years ago when 
collusion was much more probable with the Korean consumer electronics industry.  I will 
argue that this is the case, and collusion in the home market is not a likely response.  
However, there is evidence to contradict my argument, and suggest that collusion is still 
highly probable.    
 More specifically, the Korean Fair Trade Commission found nine Korean steel 
makers guilty in 2003 of fixing prices.  Of the nine firms, POSCO was not on the list, 
however, their two closest competitors, INI and Dongkuk, were both cited.  Of the 74.9 
billion won fine (65.1 million USD), 41.9 billion was assessed between INI and 
Dongkuk10. 
 Additionally refuting my argument is the theory that an increase in liberalization, 
such as what we have seen in Korea opening up to foreign investment and imports, 
increases a firm’s incentive to participate in a cartel (Everett, Valentine, and Suslow, 
1997, p. 1221).  When formerly uncompetitive markets become more competitive, firms 
that were previously protected may result to collusion for leverage.   
However, I believe that Korea’s trade policy after the 1997 financial crisis was 
one that developed firms to be viable in a competitive market.  This opposed to a national 
policy that continues to shelter inefficient, domestic firms, as some proponents of 
protectionism in the U.S. may believe.  Using theory developed by Rugman and Verbeke 
(1990), I argue that Korea’s trade policy formulation during the post-1997 crisis was one 
that promoted “firm-specific advantages” (FSA), rather than sheltering inefficient 
producers.  POSCO is a good example of a Korean firm that received short-term 
protection from the government, but not long-term shelter.  A nation pursuing an FSA 
                                                
10 Kim, Young-hoon, JoongAng Daily, 09.30.2003 
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strategy may favor free trade and will not shelter firms in the long run.  Rugman and 
Verbeke cite three characteristics of a “competent executive bureaucracy” which are 
essential to “efficient implementation” of strategic trade policy that produce viable free 
market firms in the long run.  First, the bureaucracy must have “extensive industry-
specific knowledge” (Rugman and Verbeke, 1990, p. 94).  Before the financial crisis, the 
state was a significant shareholder (greater than 33%) of POSCO; therefore, they 
possessed substantial knowledge of the industry.  Second, the bureaucracy must have the 
“capacity to identify winning and losing firms” (Rugman, 1990, p. 94).  Traditionally, 
Korea has done a remarkable job targeting successful firms.  The restructuring of steel 
industry and elimination of inefficient firms after 1997 is testimony to this.  Third, and 
finally, the bureaucracy must possess “institutional characteristics that insulate it against 
pressure exerted by rent seeking firms” (Rugman and Verbeke, 1990, p. 94).  This final 
point is the most difficult to argue in favor of the Koreans, but coercion from IMF loans 
and trading partners, such as the U.S., established some distance from rent seeking firms 
who were eventually denied funding11. Hanbo is perhaps the best example of the Korean 
government taking a tougher stance on constraints and illustrates the second and third 
characteristics of the Korean trade regime.  Up until one year after the Asian financial 
crisis, steel mini-mill Hanbo was allegedly receiving support from the Korean 
government through the form of subsidies.  In 1998 the government stopped supporting 
or directing support to Hanbo (the firm resultantly failed) and then executed a market-
driven sale of the firm’s remaining assets.  Contrastingly, POSCO was slowly sold off 
and gradually lost all public ownership, but has since become a benchmark for 
transparency and efficiency.   
                                                
11 Office of the Press Secretary, White House, 01.07.1999 
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The Rugman and Verbeke theory is used to illustrate that, perhaps unlike before 
the post-Asian financial crisis reforms, Korea had set into place a strategic trade policy 
that created efficient firms.  POSCO is the poster-child of this effective polices.  The 
aforementioned success of the previously state-owned steel company is a testament to the 
FSAs created under Korea’s strategic trade policy during the final year of 1990s, and 
therefore, the unlikelihood that POSCO and other successful firms would need to engage 
in cartel activities.  As I alluded to earlier in the paper, the Korean steel industry has 
undergone the painful restructuring that some industry experts believe the U.S. steel firms 
steel need to undergo to become globally competitive. 
 Furthermore, considering the current climate of rising steel prices and the history 
of price collusion in Korea, Korean steel manufactures would find it difficult to collude 
to fix prices or reduce output.  In 2004, supply shortages were so severe in the Korean 
domestic market that Dongkuk pledged to shift 350,000 tons dedicated to the export 
market to the domestic market12.  After the embarrassment of price discrimination by the 
consumer electronics industry and the restructuring of chaebols, the Korean Fair Trade 
Commission has gained more traction to prevent possible collusion, as the 
aforementioned case illustrates.  Additionally, in the three previous antidumping petitions 
ending in duty orders against Korean steel, none of them featured POSCO, Dongkuk, or 
INI as a mandatory respondent.  The smaller firms more directly affected by these duties 
would find it difficult to collude in price fixing in the domestic market without the 
cooperation of at least one of the three larger firms 
 Eliminating the past practice of tinkering with discriminatory pricing at home as a 
viable, long-term strategy response to antidumping, I present the second and third 
                                                
12 Asia Times, 03.05.2004 
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alternatives, foreign direct investment, and shifting the weight of and diversifying your 
export market portfolio.    
The relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade protectionism 
has been shown to be negative (Salvatore, 1991) or positive (Safarin, 1985), usually 
depending on the industry.  The litmus test may be whether or not the two instruments of 
global business are complements or substitutes.   
In the case of a positive relationship, FDI and trade are complements.  This may 
be the case especially in service industries where there is limited local processing.  For 
example, suppose a foreign airline wishes to do business in the United States.  If more 
flights are allowed to come into the U.S., from less trade protectionism, there will be a 
probable increase in FDI through sales and other support offices. 
The paper is concerned with the case when trade protectionism and FDI have a 
negative relationship, and can be used as substitutes.  This is especially the case in 
industries with heavy manufacturing.  A classic example is the foreign direct investment 
by Japanese automakers into the U.S. after increased protectionism against auto imports. 
Steel firms, worldwide, have shown through their actions that there is enough 
local processing in the industry to warrant foreign direct investment as alternative to 
trade.  Australian, British, and Japanese based steel firms have all expanded into China 
recently, where they can manufacture domestically for the foreign auto firms; and other 
large users of steel, which have moved operations into China.  Korean firms, too, such as 
POSCO, are moving direct investment into China.  However, in this analysis, we should 
distinguish between traditional “tariff-jumping” (or FDI after the imposition of duties) 
and what Bhagwati calls “quid pro quo” foreign direct investment.  Quid pro quo comes 
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as a result of the fear or threat of increased protectionism in the target market (Salvatore, 
1991, p. 94). 
  The third alternative involves multiple export markets.  One could argue that this 
theory implies abandoning an initial strategy for the target market, which may be the 
case, but in reality, the firm will have more considerations than a simple two-nation 
scenario.  Under this scenario, Korean steel would increase their exports to a third 
market, while their exports to the U.S. decrease as a result of the antidumping duties. 
 There are other motivations to consider rather than the firm abandoning the initial 
target market.  Perhaps, the U.S. is not the initial target market, but Korean firms are only 
interested in distracting competition away from the true target market.  For example, 
Korean steel may have been attempting to induce antidumping barriers in “protection 
building trade”, a theory put forward by Blonigen and Ohno (1998). 
 The case of “protection-building trade” suggests that a firm will artificially 
increase exports to market A in period one to raise trade barriers in market A during 
period two.  The firm investing in additional exports would have incentive for the 
increased protectionism, which would hurt competitors who are truly interested in market 
A.  While the competition is hampered in market A, the Korean steel firm, who in this 
model provoked the protectionism in the first place with artificially high exports, will pull 
out of market A to focus on their true target market.  The one flaw in this theory as it 
applies to my suggested alternative is that firms that undertake “protection-building 
trade” typically have long-term interests in the market to which they export to and 
provoke antidumping charges (usually through later FDI).  The common response to 
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“protection-building trade” would be to enter the market through foreign direct 
investment after increasing one firm’s domestic market share through inflated exports. 
 Regardless of the motivation though, whether it is premeditated competitive 
maneuver or abandoning the initial target market, this alternative proposes that the 
Korean steel industry will respond to antidumping duties by altering the diversification in 
their export portfolio. 
 
VII.  The antidumping cases of focus 
 
 My eight focus cases are listed in Table 1 with all pertinent information including 
the petition date, the final order date, the product (in name and HTS code), the firms 
involved and duties assessed, the export trade data13, and the U.S. Department of 
Commerce case reference codes.  In addition to the table, I would like to give a brief 
summary of the case portfolio that I will be examining.  Of the eight steel cases seven are 
categorized under “iron and steel” and one is categorized under “articles of iron or 
steel”14.    
The time period was chosen because of the significant change in the Korean 
domestic market after the 1997 financial crisis.  Therefore, only antidumping petitions 
filed on January 1, 1998 or after are included in the portfolio, since those cases would 
most closely resemble the circumstances currently faced by Korean firms in the post-
Asian financial crisis environment.  Additionally, I am examining petitions that have 
reached a final affirmative decision only.  The purpose of this paper is to consider how 
                                                
13 All trade data is from the Korea International Trade Administration (KITA). 
14 Chapter 72 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States consists of “iron and steel”.  Chapter 
73 consists of “articles of iron or steel”.   
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Korean firms respond to U.S. antidumping duty orders, not the petition itself.  There is 
great variation among the products (which have been categorized to the sixth digit of the 
HTS code) from a $25 million export market in the petition year (2000) for stainless steel 
angles to a $756 million export market in the petition year (1998) for stainless steel sheet 
and strip in coils.  There is additional diversity in the second market for the respective 
product groups, China, Japan, Hong Kong, and Canada are each a second market in at 




 I choose to argue and analyze the strategy response option of a Korean firm 
refocusing to a second export market (here after , ‘Market B’, defined as the leading, non-
U.S. export market for the said product group in the petition year).  In my presentation of 
response strategy options, this was the third alternative.  To test the association between 
the U.S. antidumping duties and the shifting of exports by the respective industries (or 
firms of affected industries), I will employ two ordinary least squares linear estimates.  
One will compare the affected product group’s difference in exports, to the U.S. market, 
the independent variable, and the difference in exports to said product group’s Market B, 
the dependent variable, in the year before the duty to the year of the duty.  The second 
estimator will have the difference of the natural log of exports between the two markets, 
as the dependent variable, regressed on a trend variable (year) and a dummy variable that 
will reflect whether the period is an antidumping duty year.  Both estimators are shown in 
 25
detail below.  In addition to the tests, I will look at each product group individually 










 The distribution for equation one is displayed on Chart 5.  The sample size is 
extremely low in this estimation, and therefore does not provide a suitable platform to 












Yi = β0  +  β1USi + ε 
 
Y: Change in the export volume (metric tons) of the ith product group’s exports to 
Market B from the year before the duty order to the year of the duty order 
 
US: Change in the export volume (metric tons) to the ith product group’s exports to 
the US from the year before the duty order to the year of the duty order 
 
Estimates 
 Coefficient      t      p      
β0   15296.9 (15575.36) 0.9821  0.3640 
 
β1 -0.5191 (0.2080) -2.4961  0.0468 
 
n = 8 
R-squared: 0.5094 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.4277 
Equation Two 
 
YT = β0  +  β1T  +  β2AD + ε 
 
Y: The difference, in year T, between product groups’ natural logged exports (metric 
tons) to Market B and product groups’ natural logged exports (metric tons) to the US; 
[Ln(Exports to Mrkt BT) – Ln(Exports to UST)] 
T: The year where 1994 is T equal to 1 
AD: Dummy variable where in an antidumping duty order year AD is equal to 1, 
otherwise AD is equal to 0 
 
Estimates 
 Coefficient      t      p      
β0   -6.0957 (0.9800) -6.2200  1.8E-08 
 
β1 0.9325 (0.2080)  6.3535  9.98E-09 
 
β2 0.4342 (1.6143)  0.2690  0.7886 
 
n = 88 
R-squared: 0.3325 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.3168 
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the graph on Chart 5.  There is a negative relationship between the independent variable 
and dependent variable.  The question that this estimator leaves unanswered however, 
(because of the simplicity of the equation and the small number of observations) is  
whether the negative relationship is exclusive to the antidumping cases?  Alternatively, it  
may be the case that non-antidumping years, too, have a negative relationship between 
different market exports (US and Market B) and that the negative relationship is 
explained by another variable, time.  These important variables were included in the 
second estimation. 
Equation Two illustrates that time, rather than antidumping duties, has a 
significant relationship with the difference in export volumes to the U.S. and respective 
Market B for affected product groups.  With such a high t-value and very small p-value, 
we can reject a null hypothesis of β1 ≤ 0, suggesting that in an additional calendar year; 
the difference between exports (metric tons) to Market B and the U.S. will continue to 
expand in favor of Market B.  Consequently, the argument that a relationship exists 
between antidumping duties and a shift in exports is weakened.  Although the sign of the 
coefficient β2 = 0.4342 is in the expected direction (where in an antidumping year there is 
a positive expansion between exports to Market B and exports to the U.S.), the high p-
value of .7886 is unconvincing.  Chart 6 illustrates the distribution of the observations for 
equation two. 
 Next, I will look at a few of these cases individually.   
 The U.S. export market for Structural Steel Beams (A-580-841) (Chart 7) 
accounted for 16 percent (190,017 tons) of Korean exports of structural steel beams 
during the petition year, 1999.  Canada, the Market B for this case, consisted of nearly 12 
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percent (139,600 tons) of Korean exports.  In the following year (2000) Canada’s import 
of Korean structural steel beams expanded by 58.8% in volume, to move the nation to a 
20 percent share (221,691 tons) of Korean exports by volume.  You will notice this was 
accompanied by a significant price increase in Canada; which meant Canada’s increase in 
imports of steel beams in terms of sales was even larger.  The interesting note is that price 
increases were relatively close in the U.S. and Canada (32 and 27 percent respectively, 
compared to only 16 percent in non-US markets), yet the increase in Canada was 
proportionately larger than the increases in all other markets.   
 I chose to look specifically at Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bars (A-580-844) 
(Chart 8) because of the heavy dependence on the U.S. market for Korean exporters in 
this product group.  In the petition year of 2000, 73.5 percent (204,574 tons) of Korean 
exports in steel concrete reinforcing bars went to the U.S. market.  14 percent (40,044 
tons) of the market was in Hong Kong, Market B.  In the following year, U.S. shipments 
fell by over 125,000 tons while exports to Hong Kong increased by over 90,000 tons, 
increasing Hong Kong’s share of the Korean export market to 51 percent (131,841 tons).  
The U.S. share had fallen to 28 percent (73,539 tons).  The interesting note in this case is 
that prices fell by a greater degree in all non-US markets (9 percent) than in Hong Kong 
(a decrease of 3 percent), yet Hong Kong accounts for well over 75 percent of the 
increased concrete reinforcing bar exports for the year 2000.  Korean exporters were 
targeting their Market B rather than multiple third markets.   
 The Prestressed Concrete Steel Wire Strand (A-580-852) (Chart 9) case, also the 
most recent case to have reached an affirmative antidumping decision, represents one of 
the two cases in this portfolio where volume to the respective Market B (China) 
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decreased in the year following the antidumping petition filing in the United States.  In 
this case, the Korean industry responded with an increase in exports, but it was to 
multiple third markets.  While both the U.S. and China experienced a decrease in imports 
of Korean PS concrete steel wire strand, there was a 7 percent increase in volume and 27 
percent increase on sales worldwide.  In all non-U.S. markets combined, Korean exports 
of PS concrete steel wire strand increased by nearly 19,000 tons.  The U.S. and China 
markets, which collectively accounted for 50 percent of exports in the petition year of 
2003, saw a composite decrease of 4,000 tons in 2004.   






IX. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The examination of Korean steel industry responses to the affirmative U.S. 
antidumping final decisions was primarily only examined through my third response 
strategy alternative.  The first alternative, price adjustments in the home market, I 
dismissed in my analysis of strategy options.  I will address the second alternative, that of 
foreign direct investment, further along in this section. 
My portfolio of eight steel cases does not conclusively prove my hypothesis in 
this paper that Korean exporters will, in the face of U.S. antidumping duties, dump their 
A-580-831 Stainless Steel Plate in Coils Chart 10 
A-580-834 Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils Chart 11 
A-580-836 Cut-to-Length Carbon-Quality Steel Plate Chart 12 
A-580-846 Stainless Steel Angle    Chart 13 
A-580-847 Stainless Steel Bar    Chart 14 
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product to another market by disproportionately exporting to the leading, non-U.S. 
market.  However, I do believe the portfolio and regression equations suggest a 
relationship between the export markets and raise questions about the strategy of the 
Korean steel industry. 
More specifically, the first and perhaps the most obvious suggestion from the 
regression analysis, is the positive relationship between the difference in exports to the 
respective ‘Market B’ and the U.S. market and time (or a ‘negative’ relationship between 
Market B and the U.S. over time).   Chart 6 is quite revealing of the upward trend since 
the mid-1990s.   
Second, looking at the antidumping cases, equation one suggests a negative 
relationship (Chart 5) between exports to Market B and exports to the U.S., although the 
relationship is not statistically significant when included in a large sample with non-
antidumping years.  And looking at the cases individually, while some were convincing 
of a negative relationship15, the two most recent cases both showed a decrease in exports 
to Market B in the antidumping year.   
There are two questions that I would like to highlight in closing. 
 First, looking at the two exception cases where exports to Market B decreased and 
with the assumption that there is a significant positive relationship between antidumping 
duty orders in the U.S. and exports to Market B, is the strategy of Korean firms to 
diversify their export markets, rather than refocus on a new ‘target’ market?  As I have 
noted in this paper, scholars on Korean liberalization suggest that Korean firms have had 
the opportunity to expand and diversify their export markets and have taken advantage of 
                                                
15 Cut-to-Length Carbon-Quality Steel Plate (2000), Structural Steel Beams (2000), and Steel Concrete 
Reinforcing Bars (2001) were the most significant cases reflecting a negative relationship 
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that opportunity.  However, considering the new emerging steel markets, notably China 
and India, one can easily counter the diversification argument in favor of the ‘refocusing’ 
strategy.  It is plausible that Korean firms, in the face of U.S. protectionism, have 
committed more resources to the growing Chinese market.  In four of the eight portfolio 
cases China, the world’s largest importer of steel, was Market B.  POSCO, who in 2000 
produced 27.7 million tons of steel16, is already planning direct investment into China, 
and possibly India, as automakers and other manufactures in need of steel relocate 
operations from Europe, North America, and Japan.  As CEO Lee Ku-taek said, “We are 
already planning to build a production base that can produce 10 million tons a year in 
foreign countries, such as China and India, within 10 years”17.  Overall, POSCO is 
investing $800 million USD into China over the next 10 years18. 
 This discussion begs the question of how much influence China’s booming steel 
market has on the upward shift of Equation Two (Chart 6), compared to U.S. 
antidumping duties (or at least the sense of protectionism), or any other time sensitive 
variables, and how these variable drive the decisions of Korean firms?    
This will allow me to briefly revisit and answer the question of foreign direct 
investment as alternative for Korean firms in the U.S.  The evidence of these cases and 
the rapidly growing Chinese market suggests that the Korean firm would not respond to 
the U.S. antidumping duties with FDI in the U.S., where the steel industry is eroding and 
the domestic demand is much weaker than other markets.  The only location Korean 
firms are presently considering FDI are in the developing economies. 
                                                
16 Breckenridge, T., Cleveland Plain Dealer, 11.11.2001 
17 Park, H.M., JoongAng Daily, 08.17.2004 
18 Brooke, J., New York Times, 02.10.2004 
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Returning to China, I will concede that the booming steel industry is more likely 
the greater influence on certain cases shifting disproportionate amounts of exports to 
China.  However, I will argue that the issue of antidumping duties in the U.S. versus the 
historical lack of antidumping instruments in China has played a factor as well.  After all, 
if China had a steel industry as protected as the U.S. steel industry, would the market be 
as attractive?  China had not had its first antidumping case until June 1999 and for at least 
the first year; all investigations have involved basic commodities rather than heavy 
industry  (Ross and Ning, 2000).  The Chinese AD laws have been growing in 
sophistication each year.  As of March 2003, China had set in place three trade 
restrictions against Korean steel19.  I do not believe that it is coincidental that the two 
most recent cases20 are also the only two cases in my portfolio where export volume to 
Market B declined in the year of an affirmative antidumping duty.  As Chinese 
antidumping law develops, this complexity will become an area of greater interest for 
researchers.   
Therefore, although U.S. antidumping duty orders did not show a significant 
direct relationship on exports to other markets in this portfolio of steel cases, I believe it 
is highly likely that there was an indirect effect from the U.S. antidumping climate, which 
enhanced the attractiveness of the Chinese market.  This is the issue that business 
executives and exporters will need to address in the future.  From this paper, there is an 
obvious shift (Chart 6) away from the U.S. to other markets for Korean exports, but what 
is causing that increase into other markets at the expense of the U.S. steel market and 
how much do the antidumping duty orders account for in the decision making process?  
                                                
19 Yonhap, 03.11.2003 
20 A-580-852, Final USITC Decision: 01.07.2004, A-580-847, Final USITC Decision: 03.07.2002 
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Consequently, will Korean exporters choose to refocus on one secondary market, 
possibly one with a weak antidumping enforcement, or diversify to multiple third 
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Chart 1   
Trade Restrictions on Korean Steel Industry, 
Active in March 2003 
Country No. of Restrictions 







European Union 1 
Indonesia 1 
Poland 1 
Source: Korean Iron and Steel Association, March 
2003, Breakdown for US (13 antidumping, 5 
countervailing, 3 safeguard) 
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Chart 10: Trend - A-580-831
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Chart 11: Trend - A-580-834
















































Chart 12: Trend - A-580-836
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